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Abstract— This paper contains a reformulation of any n-
player finite, static game into a framework of distributed,
dynamical system based on agents’ payoff-based deviations. The
reformulation generalizes the method employed in the second
part of the study of countries’ relation formation problem in [1]
to the case of any finite, static game. In the paper two deviation
rules are provided and possible applications of this framework
are discussed.
Index Terms— asynchronous, synchronous, strategy, transi-
tion probability
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper contains a development of a distributed, dy-
namical system framework using the agents’ strategy and
payoff information in a finite, static game. In this framework,
instead of reaching a static equilibrium, agents alternatively
engage in what is termed as long-term “distributed de-
viation” by updating their own strategies myopically and
autonomously. An agent can be said to be “myopic” if she
only focuses on the current payoff rather than the predicted
future payoff when she deviates, and “autonomous” if she
makes the decision only for herself. The distributed deviation
process eventually gives rise to a Markov chain of all strategy
profiles in the finite, static game.
Motivating example. The basic idea of agents’ distributed
deviation can be first illustrated through a motivating exam-
ple below, which is the classical “prisoner dilemma” game.
There are two agents, 1 and 2, each of whom has two
possible strategies, “cooperative” (C) or “defective” (D).
Each agent receives a level of payoff associated with each of
the four possible combinations of strategies, termed as the
four “strategy profiles”. The table of payoffs is below.
XXXXXXXXXXAgent 2
Agent 1
(C) (D)
(C) (-1,-1) (-3, 0)
(D) (0,-3) (-2,-2)
Two observations can be made regarding the four strategy
profiles in the prisoner dilemma game from the agents’
deviation perspective:
1) firstly, each agent can only “locally” deviate, i.e.,
This work was supported by National Science Foundation grant
n.1607101.00 and US Air Force grant n. FA9550-16-1-0290.
Y. Li is with the Department of Political Science, F. Liu and A. S. Morse
are with the Department of Electrical Engineering, Yale University, New
Haven, CT, USA, {yuke.li, fengjiao.liu, as.morse}@yale.edu
within a subset of the four strategy profiles. For
instance, suppose that initially they play (C,C). In-
dividually, agent 1 can only stay at (C,C) or deviate
to (D,C), while agent 2 can only stay at (C,C) or
deviate to (C,D).
2) secondly, depending on their deviation order, they may
reach quite different strategy profiles. Suppose that
only one agent is allowed to deviate from (C,C) at
each point in time, and that they myopically deviate.
From (C,C), they would expect to arrive at (D,C) or
(C,D) depending on which agent is allowed to deviate.
And it is possible for them to arrive at (D,D) if both
are allowed to deviate at the same time, and have no
knowledge of others’ deviation.
Finite, static games have provided a complete table of all
possible strategy combinations of all agents and the associ-
ated payoffs for each of them. This is a basis for formulating
an alternative problem of distributed deviation by myopic,
autonomous agents. There are scenarios or applications in
real life that may be best studied as a distributed deviation
process of myopic and autonomous agents. Especially, from
the perspective of an outsider with a certain degree of hind-
sights when examining a historic process such as countries’
relation dynamics in [1], agents in those processes behave
myopically, however farsighted they aim to be. An example
is trading behavior in the stock market; traders act without
any knowledge of what others might do simultaneously or
what might happen in the distant future, and will only act for
the next point in time after the outcome of a previous point
in time is realized. Another example is migration processes
in new lands such as the Americas and Australia. In the
case of North America, different groups of migrants arrived
“asynchronously”, with pilgrims and puritans among the first,
and the rest to follow.
In Section II, the transitions among strategy profiles made
possible by agents’ individual deviations will be studied as a
distributed, dynamical system using the payoff information
from the finite, static game. Each agent only needs to know
her own payoff information in order to make deviations in
the dynamical system.
In relation to the existing literature. This paper generalizes
the method in [1] initially developed for offering a dynamical
perspective toward the countries’ relation formation problem
to the case of any n-player finite, static game. The differences
of this paper from the approaches in several related strands
of literature and, relatedly, some problems where it can most
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suitably apply are the following:
First, the paper develops the dynamical system framework
drawing on Markov chain. The class of games extensively
using Markov decision processes is stochastic games [2]. But
the major difference with stochastic games, the dynamics
of agents’ deviation process in this paper do not require
agents to act in mutual best responses as required by game
equilibria.
Second, the framework in this paper relates to the follow-
ing work on payoff-based learning in games, such as [3], [4],
[5] and [6], in the sense that agents’ distributed deviation in
this paper will also be payoff-based. However, in this paper
agents are assumed to deviate to where they are better off,
not necessarily where is their best responses.
Third, the framework in this paper can be used for the
purpose of equilibrium selection for finite, static games; this
is achieved by designing the agents’ deviation process, e.g.,
how they transition among the strategy profiles. Some well-
known equilibrium selection methods were developed for
evolutionary games (e.g., [7], [8] and [9], and for signaling
games (e.g., [10]). Equilibrium selection was done based on a
certain perfection criteria for equilibria (e.g., [11], [12], [13])
or a certain strategy revision process [14]. It appears that the
equilibrium selection method in this paper is different from
all these existing ones.
Lastly, the framework in this paper is technically similar
to graph dynamical system (e.g., [15]), of which two variants
are cellular automata and interacting particle systems. Graph
dynamical systems represent a useful approach for capturing
distributed, dynamical phenomena with local interactions. A
review of applications of methods in statistical mechanics
in social issues can be found in [16]. However, in many of
these works, the evolution rules are usually not payoff or
preference-based (an exception is [17]), which explains the
major difference from this paper. Therefore, this framework
may be applied in those issue areas to arrive at possibly
different conclusions.
Structure of the paper. The development of this paper pro-
ceeds with the following. Firstly, the distributed, dynamical
system framework of agents’ distributed deviation will be
proposed in Section II. Secondly, some analysis of the
framework will be provided in Section III. Thirdly, possible
applications of this framework will be illustrated in Section
IV.
II. THE FRAMEWORK
A. Finite, Static Game.
A finite, static game is generally formulated as follows.
Suppose there are a finite number of agents indexed by the
elements in V = {1, 2, ..., n}. Each of them has a finite
strategy set Si and si ∈ Si is a strategy of agent i.
The set of all possible strategy profiles S in the game-
theoretic terminology, i.e., the strategy combination of all
agents, is therefore the Cartesian product of all agents’
strategy sets S1 × S2 × ... × Sn, and a finite set. Let
s = [s1 s2 . . . sn] denote a strategy profile in S. Let
p : S → Rn
be the payoff function such that for s ∈ S, p(s) =
[p1(s) p2(s) . . . pn(s)] where pi(s) is the payoff for agent
i from the strategy profile s, for each i ∈ V . With the
components being so defined, a game can therefore be
specified as the collection Γ = {V,S, p}.
B. Agents’ distributed deviations
At time t+1, each agent updates its own strategy based on
the strategies of others at time t. It should be noted that it is
not required that an agent’s payoff is affected by all others’
strategies. While updating its own strategy, agent i implicitly
assumes that the strategies of all other agents remain the
same. For simplicity, let the strategy profile at time t be u
and the strategy profile at time t+ 1 be v ∈ S.
Set of deviations from a strategy profile. From u, agent i can
only deviate to a subset of S, which we define as agent i’s
set of deviations from u and denote using Siu, in which u is
by default an element. A strategy profile in Siu that is not u
is only different from u in terms of the i-th coordinate, i.e.,
agent i’s strategy.
In the previous example, from the strategy profile (C,C),
agent 1’s deviation set is {(C,C), (D,C)}.
Individual transition probability. Any agent chooses a time-
invariant nonnegative probability called individual transition
probability with which to transition from a strategy profile to
another. Any agent’ transition probabilities are based solely
on her own payoff information. Formally speaking, the map
ψi : S × S → [0, 1]
denotes agent i’s transition probability from a strategy profile
to another.
If v is not in agent i’s deviation set from u, we stipulate
that ψi(u, v) = 0; otherwise, ψi(u, v) is a time-invariant
function of agent i’s payoffs specified in the game Γ.
In the previous example, (D,D) is not in agent 1’s
deviation set from (C,C). Agent 1’s total probabilities of
staying at (C,C) and transitioning to (D,C) sum to 1.
Deviation order. Two possible deviation orders are:
1) Asynchronous updating. The first deviation rule is
where only one agent deviates at each time. Suppose
only one agent is picked based on a nonnegative
probability ai to deviate at any time instant, where
the total probabilities for all agents sum to 1 as below.
The received chance for agent i to deviate can be a
good proxy of its “agenda-setting power”.
ai ∈ [0, 1], and
∑
i∈V
ai = 1
In the previous example, suppose agent 1 and agent
2 both receives 1/2 probability of deviation. For in-
stance, suppose that agent 1 transitions to (D,C) with
probability 1 and agent 2 transitions to (D,C) with
probability 0. The transition probability from (C,C)
to (D,C) will then be 1/2.
2) Synchronous updating. The second deviation rule is
where agents deviate simultaneously. In synchronous
deviation, any agent deviates by assuming all others’
strategies to remain fixed. Therefore, the strategy pro-
file they eventually arrive at can be different from what
they expect themselves to deviate to. This gives us
a definition of “anticipated strategy profile”. Denote
viu ∈ Siu as the anticipated new strategy profile by i
when deviating from strategy profile u, where only its
i-th coordinate is the same as that of v, and the rest
of the n− 1 coordinates are the same as those in u.
Strategy profile transition probability. Let the transition prob-
ability matrix of the strategy profiles be Z = [ζuv] ∈
[0, 1]|S|×|S|, where ζuv represents the transition probability
from a strategy profile u to another v. The strategy profile
transition probability is reflected in the arc weight of H as
previously defined. Time-invariant Z is the focus of this
paper.
Next is a discussion of how agents’ deviation order (i.e.,
asynchronous or synchronous) impacts the way in which
the individual transition probability from u to v, ψi(u, v),
aggregates to the strategy profile transition probability from
u to v, ζuv .
1) In asynchronous deviation. The transition probability
from u to v, ζuv , can be expressed as
ζuv =
∑
i∈V
aiψi(u, v).
2) In synchronous deviation. The transition probability
from u to v, ζuv , is the product of every agent’s indi-
vidual transition probability from u to her anticipated
strategy profile viu,
ζuv =
∏
i∈V
ψi(u, v
i
u).
In the previous example, suppose agent 1 transitions
to (D,C) with probability 1 and agent 2 transitions
to (C,D) with probability 1, the transition probability
from (C,C) to (D,D) will be 1. In fact, the transition
probability from any other strategy profile to (D,D)
will be 1, and the probability of staying at (D,D) is
also 1.
Deviation process. Below is a discussion of the elements
necessary to understand the deviation process.
1) Initial distribution. Agents can be regarded as being
initially involved in a distribution of all strategy pro-
files in S.
Denote the distribution of all the strategy profiles in
S at time T as piT . piT = [piTu ]1×|S|, where piTu ∈
[0, 1] representing the probability mass of staying in
the strategy profile u at time T , and ‖piT ‖1 = 1.
Obviously, pi0 represents the initial distribution.
2) Deviation process. The dynamical system is the col-
lection Ω = (Γ, pi0, Z}. Agents’ deviation process can
be conveniently understood as applying the operator Z
repeatedly to the initial distribution, i.e., pi0.
The Cesa`ro average as below
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
pi0Zk
represents the limiting distribution of the strategy pro-
files in the deviation process.
C. Assumptions on agents’ transition probabilities
An agent’s transition probability between strategy profiles
can be assumed to satisfy the following basic assumptions:
1) The total probabilities of staying at original strategy
profiles and transitioning to different ones in either
deviation are normalized to be 1.
In asynchronous updating,∑
v∈Siu
ψi(u, v) = 1.
In synchronous updating,∑
viu∈Siu
ψi(u, v
i
u) = 1
2) It can be assumed that in either updating from any
strategy profile agents will only assign positive prob-
ability to other strategy profiles giving better payoffs;
otherwise, they will remain playing the original strat-
egy profile u with probability 1. Technically speaking,
If 6 ∃v ∈ Siu such that pi(v) > pi(u), then
ψi(u, v) = 0,∀v ∈ S, v 6= u, and ψi(u, u) = 1
Otherwise,
ψi(u, v) > 0
III. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Property of the strategy profile transition graph. In this
section the strategy profile transition graph H = {S,A} will
be defined and discussed.
A strategy profile transition graph H = {S,A}, is a
directed and weighted graph, where each strategy profile (or
“state”) in S will be regarded as a vertex and any transitions
in the strategy profiles as “walks” from a vertex to another.
The weight of the arc directed from one vertex to another
represents the transition probability from one strategy profile
to another. For i ∈ V , let di be the trivial metric on Si, i.e.,
di(ui, vi) = 0 if ui = vi ∈ Si and di(ui, vi) = 1 if ui 6= vi,
and ui, vi ∈ Si. A metric d : S × S → {0, 1, 2, . . . , n} can
be defined on the set S such that for u, v ∈ S, d(u, v) is the
number of coordinates of u that differ from v, i.e.,
d(u, v) =
n∑
i=1
di(ui, vi),
where ui and vi are the i-th coordinates of u and v,
respectively.
In the case of asynchronous deviation, H will only contain
arcs between strategy profiles with distance at most 1.
However, in the case of synchronous deviation, H may also
contain arcs between strategy profiles with distance up to n.
The weights of the arcs depends on individual transition
probabilities. An arc in H with zero weight means that this
arc does not exist. As in the previous example, an arc does
not exist between (C,C) and (D,D) with distance 2 in
asynchronous deviation, while an arc between them does
exist in synchronous deviation. But if we adjust the payoffs,
the individual transition probabilities will then change ac-
cordingly, in which case the arc between (C,C) and (D,D)
may no longer exist in synchronous deviation.
Convergence. In this section it is proven in Proposition 1 that
Z is always a stochastic matrix.
Proposition 1: In either asynchronous updating or syn-
chronous updating, every row of Z sums to 1.
Proof of Proposition 1: In asynchronous updating,
∑
v∈S
ζuv =
∑
v∈S
∑
i∈V
aiψi(u, v) =
∑
i∈V
ai
∑
v∈Siu
ψi(u, v)
Since
∑
v∈Su,i
ψi(u, v) = 1, then
∑
v∈S
ζuv =
∑
i∈V
ai = 1
In synchronous updating,
∑
v∈S
ζuv =
∑
v∈S
∏
i∈V
ψi(u, v
i
u)
The above expression can be equivalently expressed as
∑
v∈S
∏
i∈V
ψi(u, v
i
u) =
∏
i∈V
∑
v∈Siu
ψi(u, v) = 1
Therefore, under both rules, every row of Z sums to 1. 
An argument for any Markov Chain on finite state space to
have a stationary distribution is given by the Brouwer Fixed
Point Theorem. The Cesa`ro average as discussed earlier
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
pi0Zk
defines the limiting distribution of the strategy profiles, which
will be of interest for studying this the deviation process.
Basically, this framework can be used for the relationship
between the game predictions and the dynamical system pre-
dictions. There can be some equivalence results between the
game predictions and the dynamical system predictions. Two
of these results are stated in Proposition 2 and Proposition
3.
Linkage with pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Proposition 2
explores a link between the distributed, dynamical system
and the original static, finite game, by suggesting that an
equilibrium strategy profile in the static game is always a
stationary distribution.
Recall the definition that a strategy profile s∗ is a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium if no agent would strictly benefit
in terms of payoff by deviating to any other strategy profile
sˆ ∈ S, that is,
∀sˆ ∈ S, pi(sˆ) ≤ pi(s∗),∀i ∈ V
Proposition 2: A Nash equilibrium s∗ of the static game
Γ corresponds to a unit left eigenvector of Z. Such a left
eigenvector is a stationary distribution of Z.
Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose s∗ ∈ S is the k-th strategy
profiles. Since s∗ is a Nash equilibrium, which means that
no agent is willing to deviate, and by definition, ∀s 6= s∗ ∈
S,∀i ∈ V, ψi(s∗, s) = 0. By decomposability of Z, we have
Z =
 A(k−1)×(k−1) α(k−1)×1 B(k−1)×(n−k)01×(k−1) 1 01×(n−k)
C(n−k)×(k−1) β(n−k)×1 D(n−k)×(n−k)

Let ek = [0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
(k−1) 0′s
, 1, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
(n−k) 0′s
] be the correspondent
eigenvector of Z. It is easy to know that ekZ = ek, which
means that the unit vector ek is a left eigenvector of Z. Since
‖ek‖1 = 1, it is also a stationary distribution of Z. 
If Γ has unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium, Z will
have a stationary distribution in which the probability mass
of that strategy profile is 1. If Γ has multiple pure strategy
equilibria, any vector in the span of correspondent unit
eigenvectors of Z is a stationary distribution.
Linkage with mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. For instance,
the cases in which the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of
the finite game coincide with the eigenvector of the transition
matrix of the dynamical system can be derived.
Let Γ be a finite game with two agents, in which agent 1
has two strategies to play with, namely U and D, and agent
2 also has two strategies to play with, namely L and R. The
payoff matrix of Γ is shown below. For example, if agent 1
plays strategy U and agent 2 plays strategy L, the payoffs
received by agent 1 and agent 2 are p1(U,L) and p2(U,L),
respectively.
Now suppose p1(D,L) > p1(U,L) and p1(U,R) >
p1(D,R) for agent 1; p2(U,L) > p2(U,R) and p2(D,R) >
p2(D,L) for agent 2. Then the game has no pure strategy
Nash equilibrium and the strategy profile deviation process
follows a counter-clockwise cycle. Of course a mixed strat-
egy Nash equilibrium exists, in which agent 1 plays strategy
U with probability a and agent 2 plays strategy L with
probability b, where 0 < a, b < 1.
TABLE I: The payoff matrix of Γ
agent 2
agent 1
L R
U (p1(U,L), p2(U,L)) (p1(U,R), p2(U,R))
D (p1(D,L), p2(D,L)) (p1(D,R), p2(D,R))
Then the discrete-time strategy profile deviation process is
modeled as a Markov chain. The four states of the Markov
chain are the four strategy profiles. At each time instant,
assume the two agents will synchronously and myopically
choose whether to update their own strategies from the last
time instant. A family of the transition matrices for the
Markov chain, Z, is
1.(U,L) 2.(U,R) 3.(D,L) 4.(D,R)
1.(U,L) 1− ρ1 0 ρ1 0
2.(U,R) ρ2 1− ρ2 0 0
3.(D,L) 0 0 1− ρ3 ρ3
4.(D,R) 0 ρ4 0 1− ρ4
where 0 < ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, ρ4 < 1.
Proposition 3: If the transition probabilities of
the Markov chain satisfy ρ1 : ρ2 : ρ3 : ρ4 =
(p1(D,L) − p1(U,L))(p2(U,L) − p2(U,R)) :
(p1(U,R) − p1(D,R))(p2(U,L) − p2(U,R)) :
(p1(D,L)− p1(U,L))(p2(D,R)− p2(D,L)) : (p1(U,R)−
p1(D,R))(p2(D,R) − p2(D,L)), the unique stationary
distribution is [ab, a(1− b), (1− a)b, (1− a)(1− b)].
Proof of Proposition 3: Let pi = [ab, a(1 − b), (1 −
a)b, (1 − a)(1 − b)]. By the definition of mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium,
a =
p2(D,R)− p2(D,L)
p2(D,R)− p2(D,L) + p2(U,L)− p2(U,R)
b =
p1(U,R)− p1(D,R)
p1(U,R)− p1(D,R) + p1(D,L)− p1(U,L)
Let
ρ1 = (p1(D,L)− p1(U,L))(p2(U,L)− p2(U,R))ρ0,
ρ2 = (p1(U,R)− p1(D,R))(p2(U,L)− p2(U,R))ρ0
ρ3 = (p1(D,L)− p1(U,L))(p2(D,R)− p2(D,L))ρ0,
ρ4 = (p1(U,R)− p1(D,R))(p2(D,R)− p2(D,L))ρ0
where ρ0 is small enough to ensure 0 < ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, ρ4 < 1.
It can be checked that piZ = pi, so pi is a stationary distri-
bution. As the Markov chain is irreducible and aperiodic, pi
is the unique stationary distribution. 
In the mixed Nash strategy equilibrium of this game,
the probability of the two players playing strategy profiles
(U,L), (U,R), (D,L), and (D,R) are ab, a(1 − b), (1 −
a)b, and (1 − a)(1 − b), respectively, which is exactly the
stationary distribution of the Markov chain. Proposition 3
also illustrates that by properly choosing the state transition
probabilities of the Markov chain based on the payoffs, each
player can optimize its own payoff.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Summary of the framework.
1) Two graphs. Other than the strategy profile transi-
tion graph, there exists another two graphs from the
framework, which may be useful for the analysis with
regards to certain variations of finite, static games.
First, a finite, static game provides the required in-
formation for setting up a neighbor graph of agents,
where an agent’s neighbors in this graph are those
whose strategies will affect its payoff.
Second, the game has the required information for set-
ting up an interaction graph of agents. In an interaction
graph, the neighbors of agents are those toward whom
agents direct their strategies, and the strategy toward
one neighbor is independent of the strategy toward the
other. This is especially so if the agents are connected
through a network. The difference from a neighbor
graph is that an agent can not necessary affect the
payoffs of her neighbors in the interaction graph.
2) Two probabilities. The framework has two important
probabilities, which are agents’ individual transition
probabilities between the strategy profiles and the
probabilities of the strategy profiles in the stationary
distribution, with the former affecting the latter and, of
course, the weights of the arcs in the strategy profile
transition graph.
How to use the framework? Two possibilities of further using
the framework are discussed below.
1) From systems to games: Based on the properties of
the dynamical system, predictions of interest for the original
game itself can be derived. As discussed in the introduction,
to apply the framework to select equilibria of the game is
an example. As is commonly known, many games have
multiple kinds of equilibria and it is impossible ex ante
to predict which equilibrium to be played by agents. The
equilibria selected can be a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium,
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, or Pareto-optimal Nash
equilibrium such as in the example below.
For instance, let Γ be a finite game with two agents, in
which agent 1 has three strategies to play with, namely U ,
C and D, and agent 2 also has three strategies to play with,
namely L, M and R. The payoff matrix of Γ is shown below.
In this game, there is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, which
is (D,R), and a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, which is
((1/2, 1/2, 0), (1/2, 1/2, 0)), where both agents are involved
in the cycle of the 1, 2, 4 and 5-th strategy profiles.
TABLE II: A Game Example
agent 2
agent 1
L M R
U 1. (-1,1) 2. (1,-1) 3. (0,0)
C 4. (1,-1) 5. (-1,1) 6. (0,0)
D 7. (0,0) 8. (0,0) 9. (3,3)
Let the discrete-time strategy profile deviation process be
modeled by a Markov chain, where the nine states of the
Markov chain are the nine strategy profiles. At each time
instant, assume the two agents will each receive a 1/2 chance
of deviation and myopically choose whether to update their
own strategies from the last time instant.
As specified in the set up, an agent’s decision rule is
actually to choose the its transition probabilities from any
strategy profile to elsewhere subject to those previously made
assumptions about payoff-based deviations. An example of
the transition matrix for the Markov chain, denoted by Z, is
1.(U,L) 2.(U,M) 3.(U,R) 4.(C,L) 5.(C,M) 6.(C,R) 7.(D,L) 8.(D,M) 9.(D,R)
1.(U,L) 1/6 0 0 1/2 0 0 1/3 0 0
2.(U,M) 1/3 1/2 1/6 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.(U,R) 1/2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/2
4.(C,L) 0 0 0 1/2 1/3 1/6 0 0 0
5.(C,M) 0 1/3 0 0 1/2 0 0 1/6 0
6.(C,R) 0 0 0 0 1/2 0 0 0 1/2
7.(D,L) 0 0 0 1/2 0 0 0 0 1/2
8.(D,M) 0 1/2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/2
9.(D,R) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Let pi = [pi(u1)pi(u2)...pi(u|S|)] be a nonnegative |S|-
dimensional vector where the j-th coordinate represents the
payoff of agent i from playing uj ∈ S. The inner product of
pi and the limiting distribution lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
pi0Zk gives the
average payoff for agent i from involving in this long-run
distributed deviation process.
From an optimization perspective, agent i can choose its
own individual transition probabilities to maximize its own
average payoffs. Its optimization problem can be formally
stated as
max
[ψi(u,v)]|U|×|U|
pi · lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
pi0Zk,
An observation is that if at least one of the transition
probabilities from the 1, 2, 4, or 5-th strategy profile to
the 3, 6, 7 or 8-th strategy profile is positive (i.e., a path
beginning in the cycle of the 1th, 2th, 4th and 5th strategy
profiles and ending out of it exists on the strategy profile
transition graph) and the initial distribution of the strategy
profiles is non-degenerate (without any component to be
“1”), both agents will play the 9-th strategy profile (D,R)
(the only pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the game) with
probability 1 in the whole process, and thus have the highest
total payoffs (with 3 for both at each stage). This is the
Pareto-optimal scenario, where no one can unilaterally gain
without having the others worse off. If not, both agents will
stay in the counter-clockwise cycle of the 1-th, 2-th, 4-th and
5-th strategy profiles, (U,L), (U,M), (C,L), and (C,M),
and incur an average payoff of 0.
The main differences of this framework in terms of equi-
librium selection from the existing methods are: firstly, while
predicting the limiting behavior of agents in this myopic,
updating process, the distribution of equilibria that arise in
this process will be predicted by the Markov chain; secondly,
the prediction is done without requiring any particular inter-
action pattern for the agents; in other words, it can apply to
the cases in which agents are connected through a network.
More generally, how agents may distributively control or
design this myopic, deviation process toward optimizing the
amount of their long-term average payoffs can be studied,
which thus transforms the equilibrium selection problem into
an optimization problem.
2) From games to systems: The basic idea formalized by
this approach is that the agents in the dynamical system may
rationally make their transitions based on payoffs, e.g., voters
in a community network changing their opinions to increase
their payoffs. One example of payoff structures is that the
game is weakly acyclic. As explained in the introduction, it
can reasonably be expected that this framework will give rise
to different predictions than the existing conclusions derived
by not assuming this payoff-based deviations. This can be
regarded as deriving predictions of interest for the dynamical
system based on the game properties, which will be another
possibility for future work.
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